Many studies analyse factors (such as corruption, competitiveness, transaction costs), which are infl uencing public procurement effi ciency. Th e purpose of this paper is to fi nd out, what the main factors are in Slovakia that are infl uencing public procurement effi ciency, and based on our analysis, we will also estimate what is the impact of each factor on the effi ciency of public procurement in Slovakia.
Introduction
Public procurement is the process whereby public authorities -including all levels of government and public agencies -buy goods, services, and works, and it is a key activity in the economy (Kastanioti et al. 2012) . In EU countries, on average, public-procurement spending is equivalent to about 15 % of GDP (Table 1) . Th erefore, signifi cant improvements in its eff ectiveness can deliver important savings, or an increase in the quality and quantity of procurement. So, public procurement warrants sustained public and academic attention.
Table 1
Th e size of public procurement in selected EU countries (2015) Public procurement to GDP: % Purchases over EU directives threshold: % Slovakia is perceived to have a relatively high level of corruption. Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index 2016 ranked it 22 nd out of 28 EU member countries, and in many cases the media directly links public-procurement problems to corruption. However, we will show that other important factors also determine the effi ciency of Slovakia's public procurement system. Th e goal of this paper is to present the opinions of procurers and suppliers on what causes ineffi ciencies in public procurement and to examine their suggestions in depth.
Literature review
Th ere is a vast literature on public procurement. Here we briefl y review the literature on the topics this paper highlights.
Excessive bureaucracy and high transactions costs are a signifi cant topic in the public procurement literature. Th e general theory of transaction costs originated with Coase (1937 Coase ( , 1960 . Later major contributions were made by, amongst others, Williamson (1985) , Demsetz (1968) , and Barzel (1985) . Transactions costs have a direct impact on a range of aspects of public procurement, including the decision whether or not to outsource the product and the fi nal price of the contract (Williamson 1985; Brown and Potoski 2003) . Pavel (2007) created a taxonomy of the main types of transaction costs connected with public procurement (Table 2) .
Table 2
Transactions costs in public procurement Source: derived from Pavel (2007 Pavel ( , 2013 .
Th e evaluation of factors determining the fi nal level of transaction costs is dealt with by Barney and Hansen (1994) , Dyer and Chu (2000) , Tadelis (2012) , Parker and Hartley (2002) , Akerlof (1970) , and Hill (1990) , amongst others.
Many authors propose that carefully constructed framework contracts and centralised procurement are eff ective tools to reduce transaction costs (Karjalainen 2011; Kastanioti et al. 2012; Dimitri et al. 2006) . Žilinčík (2015) adds the issue of whether there is an eff ective process for contract amendments. For the Czech and Slovak Republics transaction costs in public procurement have been studied by Strand et al. (2011 ), Pavel (2013 , Švejda (2010) , Sumpikova et al. (2016) and Nemec et al. (2016) . Švejda estimated that in Slovak public procurement, transaction costs vary between 0.25 and 5.6 % of the contract value. Pavel (2013) estimated that for the Czech Republic, median transactions costs per participant were 0.4 % of the contract's value. By factoring in the probability of success in bidding, he estimated that a fi rm that won a contract expended 4.6 % of the contract's value in transactions costs for the winning bid and other unsuccessful bids. Nemec (2018) argues that there is a lack of political will to implement any unpopular changes in Slovakia, and we have to motivate politicians to switch from politics to policy decision.
According to Plaček et al. (2017) the core factors determining the level of transaction costs in public procurement are the quality of the legislative and regulatory framework; the type and method of procurement; the expected volume; management's experience, especially on the procurer's side; post-award behaviour and the attitudes of participants. Nemec et al. (2016) highlighted the fact, that there is an excessive amount of cancelled tenders in Slovak and Czech public procurement, which is also increasing average transaction costs in public procurement.
Many authors argue that an electronic procurement system is the perfect tool to reduce transaction costs (Sambasivan et al. 2010; Suki and Ramayah 2010; Fernandes and Viera 2015; Prier and McCue 2007) . Sičáková-Beblavá et al. (2011) argue that e-tendering decreases transaction costs, increases transparency and improves results.
Th e issue of corruption and ethics in public procurement is another common topic. Langr and Ochrana (2015) and Langr (2018) argue that corruption in public procurement in Central and Eastern Europe has a systematic character. Many authors distinguish between corruption and the passive waste of resources. Corruption involves the active diversion of public resources to those involved in it. Bandiera et al. (2008 Bandiera et al. ( , 1278 defi ne passive waste as something whose "presence does not benefi t the public decision maker. " In other words, with public procurement the public decision maker is not motivated to increase the effi ciency of the process. If the fi nal price of a public procurement is higher than the market price, and there is no "punishment", then there is neither a tangible benefi t nor cost to the public decision maker. See also Pavel (2013) and . Plaček et al. (2018) focused on risk assessment of individual and systematic corruption at the municipal level in the Czech Republic and Bulgaria by using the Corruption Risk FMEA model, and the authors found signifi cant diff erences in corruption risk, which were detrimental in Bulgaria.
Academic research has probably most frequently focussed on the issue of competitiveness. In a heavily cited study Gupta (2002) analysed 1,937 tenders for highway construction in Florida, for 1981 Florida, for -1986 . He found that the lowest prices could be achieved with 6 to 8 bidders. Extra bidders had no impact on price. He discussed both competitive and collusive procurement markets and noted that the higher the number of bidders, the greater the protection against collusive cartels. On the effi ciency impact of collusive cartels, see Rose-Ackerman (1999) . Brannman et al. (1987) analysed auctions for timber and oil exploration and confi rmed the impact of competition on the fi nal price. Kuhlman and Johnson (1983) analysed highway construction projects in the USA during 1975 -1980 , and also confi rmed the positive impact of competition on price. Th ey also found that if the estimated price was not published, that increased the chance of a higher fi nal price. Similar results were obtained by Gilley and Karels (1981) , Elberfeld and Wolfstetter (1999) , Szymanski (1996) and Millet et al. (2004) . Iimi (2006) analysed data from 26 developing countries from the period 1999 -2005. He confi rmed that competition by suppliers decreased the fi nal price when there were up to eight bids. But beyond eight bidders the eff ect disappeared. Gineitiene and Šerpytis (2011) analysed Latvian procurement of standardised goods but were more positive about the impact of competition on the fi nal price. For some commodities they found that an extra bidder can decrease the price by more than 10 %. Ilke et al. (2012) analysed Turkish procurement, 2004 Turkish procurement, -2006 , with data from 90,089 tenders. Th eir results suggested that on average every extra bidder reduces the fi nal price by 3.9 %. Th e larger the expected fi nancial volume of a tender, the great the number of bidders. However, the average number of bidders was only 3.09. If foreign companies bid, this increased the eff ect of competition.
For the Czech Republic, Soudek and Skuhrovec (2013) analysed electricity and gas supplies, where market price comparisons are simple, as both commodities are homogeneous. Interestingly they found that the expected price in tender documentation is normally over-estimated. Whether this refl ects a desire to show savings in the fi nal deal, or whether it just refl ects caution, is unclear. Th eir core conclusion is that the key factor determining price was the selection method. On average open tenders delivered a 7 % price decrease compared to other methods. For electric power every extra bidder led to a fi nal price reduction of 1 %. However, the impact for gas was insignifi cant. E-auctions decreased the price by an extra 6 %. Th e average number of bidders was four for electricity and 3.3 for gas. Pavel (2010) analysed procurement for Czech road and railway infrastructure. He concluded that on average an extra bidder led to a price fall of 3.27 %. But the low numbers of bidders precluded estimating at what number this eff ect might cease. Importantly, the use of restricted tendering increased the price by 11.56 %.
For Slovakia, Šípoš and Klátik (2013) analysed all levels of procurement in 2012, focusing on the impact of competitiveness, e-auctions, and the method of tendering. Th e fi ndings support those of previous studies: the price decreases, at a decreasing rate, as the number of bids rises, up to a maximum of fi ve. On average e-auctions decrease the price by 5 %, and the use of open tenders also helps to lower the fi nal price. Similar results were confi rmed by Nemec (2015a, 2015b) , and the authors emphasise the fact that public procurement in Slovakia has the lowest competitiveness rate among all EU countries. Sičáková-Beblavá et al. (2013) analysed 725 procurement actions in 32 Slovak organisations during 2008 -2010 . Th ey confi rm the positive eff ects of e-auctions and of competition. Th e fi rst extra off er decreases the price by 4 %, and each additional extra off er by 84 % of the previous price change. Th ey did not fi nd a specifi c number of bidders beyond which the price ceased to fall.
Finally, some studies have examined how contracting and outsourcing impact on competition. Most of them confi rm that fi nal prices decreased as the number of bids grew and if open tenders were used. For Slovakia this was especially marked in the study by Mikušová-Meričková and Nemec (2013) . However, studies of contracted waste management in the Czech Republic, by Soukopová and Malý (2012) and Soukopová et al. (2018) , failed to fi nd such a link. In fact, although in some sub-regions there was only one bidder, prices were not noticeably higher than in sub-regions with more bidders. Afonso et al. (2006) conclude that a core problem is the use of a lowest price selection criterion, especially for services and works. Th is approach oft en leads to an unacceptably low quality of deliveries. For the Czech Republic this problem has been noted by Pavel (2013) .
Th ere are many ways of controlling the results from public procurement. Chamberland (2005) , Triantafi llou (2007) and Raymond (2008) propose that fi nal price benchmarking should be regularly used. Many studies have analysed procurement data to demonstrate achieved savings, but commonly they ignore the quality of deliveries. It is not enough just to check a transaction for probity. It is also necessary to check the quality of deliveries: that is, to exercise performance control over the procurement process.
Two Slovak studies that applied this approach covered products where the quality of deliveries was generally uniform. Vlach et al. (2004) produced a benchmarking study of goods purchased by Slovak hospitals. Th e results were damning. Price diff erences of more than 100 % were observed, with laundry services and meat purchases providing the worst examples. Hospitals paid higher prices for drugs and medical equipment than did walk-in customers in pharmacies. Sulovcová (2015) produced a straightforward benchmarking study of Slovak universities' purchases of printer toners. Most bought them at above standard market prices.
Methodology
Th e research for this paper was executed in three stages. We began in 2014 and 2015 with a small number of face-to-face in-depth interviews with specialist procurement advisors to contracting authorities. We reasoned that they would be able to provide comprehensive, detailed, and nuanced views on the likely relative importance of factors aff ecting the effi ciency of Slovak public procurement.
In the second stage, and in the light of their experience, our experience, and the literature on procurement, we developed two somewhat diff erent draft questionnaires for contracting authorities and for suppliers. Th e purpose was to discover what they felt were the core problems with the Slovak public-procurement system.
We used the Slovak Public Procurement Journal to source the addresses of the 4,300 procurement contracting authorities. We obtained 13,571 suppliers' addresses from data available on the emarket (www.eks.sk).
Th e questionnaire was administered in two phases. In the test phase we continued to send questionnaires until we had received 40 responses from contracting authorities and 80 responses from suppliers. Based on responses and feedback, we revised the questionnaire and then sent out the main mailing in the summer of 2017.
Th e fi nal response rate was not high but was suffi cient to be a representative sample. We received 211 answers from contracting authorities: a 4.91 % response rate, and 626 answers from suppliers: a 4.79 % response rate.
Th e third stage of the research focused on the main factors identifi ed: excessive bureaucracy and transaction costs; corruption and ethics; competitiveness; and inappropriate use of the lowest price selection criterion.
Core factors limiting Slovak public-procurement effi ciency
Th e questionnaires asked respondents to choose up to 3 factors that they felt adversely aff ected the effi ciency of public procurement. Th e contractors ranked factors as follows:
• Excessive bureaucracy (143 answers We combined the questionnaire answers with the information received from face-to-face interviews and with data obtained by a secondary analysis of the existing literature. Based on our synthesis of these inputs we propose a weighted list of factors limiting the effi ciency of the Slovak public procurement system (Table 3) . In the following sections we set out primary and secondary data for the most important factors noted in Table 3 .
Excessive bureaucracy and high transaction costs
Th e legislative changes are a real issue in the Slovak public procurement. Th e fi rst issue is their frequency -the Slovak public procurement law was changed 35 times in the decade from 2006, including six changes in 2015 alone. Self-evidently, such changes impose extra diffi culties and hence increased transactions costs on bidders and on contractors / procurers. Table 4 , following Pavel (2013) , shows the second legislation connected issue -the growth in the volume of legislation.
Th e growth in legislation cannot be fully explained by the need to cover novel issues, for example electronic commerce. Both Pavel (2013) and Nemec (2011) connect it to what they identify as a specifi c administrative-legislative regional characteristic: the habit of trying to resolve implementation problems, not only by improving processes, but also by enshrining the changes in ever more detailed and complex legislation. Moreover, as the enlarged law generates many concomitant regulatory and internal administrative norms, this complicates procurement execution for both suppliers and contracting authorities. Strand et al. (2011, 83) estimated the administrative costs of public procurement connected with participation in above-EU threshold 5 tenders, for 2008. Table 5 shows the estimated number of days needed to complete all the administrative steps connected with this level of procurement, separately for contractors and suppliers in each of the 27 EU countries. Th e very high costs facing Slovakia are clearly not a regional phenomenon. Both the Czech Republic and Hungary face much lower costs.
A specifi c source of transaction costs is cancelled tenders (see Table 2 ). Table  6 shows the large scale of this problem in Slovakia. Our questionnaire included a question, intended to be an indirect assessment of the impact of bureaucracy and transaction costs on the fi nal procurement outcomes. 58 % of contracting offi cials and 59 % of suppliers believed that operating without the current public procurement law (PPL) would result in lower prices and higher-quality procurements.
Transaction costs of the Slovak e-market
In this paper we recognise savings achieved by the use of e-markets and eauctions. However, we should also speak about transaction costs connected with the use of these tools. Table 7 sets out the basic characteristics of the Slovak e-market. Source: authors' calculations based on e-market data.
Th e suppliers' relatively high transaction costs are caused by the excessive bureaucracy involved in participating. Th e basic requirements are:
1. Registration on the e-market (by post or by e-signature).
2. Registration on the list of economic subjects of the Offi ce for Public Procurement.
3. Registration on the list of partners of the public sector of the Ministry of Justice (compulsory for all bidders in single tenders valued over 100,000 EUR, or a total value of 250,000 EUR for two or more tenders during a calendar year).
From our interview information, we estimated the time and complexity of requirements needed for all three registrations. Th e estimated cost for registering on the e-market is close to zero. Th e cost to register on the list of economic subjects is 87.90 EUR. At the moment, central state registers are not interconnected, and all necessary certifi cates, such as penalty registry and business registry certifi cates must be submitted in paper form. Th is part of the process requires 2 -4 weeks. Registering as a partner of the public sector is expensive and costs a minimum of 500 EUR. Th is is a recent anticorruption measure, introduced to exclude fi rms with unknown owners from the procurement process. However, not every supplier needs to register.
Th e costs to participate for Slovak public contracting authorities are covered by the Ministry of the Interior. Table 8 uses offi cial data to provide an overview of these transaction costs. Remark: Th e numbers in column one were calculated for the fi rst three years when the e-market system was operated (from 1 October 2014 until 30 September 2017). Average costs per month to operate the e-market system will be higher in 2018, because the volume and number of tenders was much lower for the fi rst few months, when the e-market system started (and total fees are calculated based on volume and also number of tenders). Th is is our estimate; based on data provided from the e-market system (the Slovak government never released the total costs for the e-market system).
Corruption and ethics
International organisations generally assess Slovakia as having a high level of corruption. For example, according to Eurobarometer (2014) 90 % of Slovak citizens feel that corruption is widespread in the country. Many authors, including Orviska and Hudson (2003) and Hunady and Orviska (2015) , argue that a key specifi c determinant is a high Slovak tolerance of corruption by the general public -people in Slovakia and also in other countries of the region are not just victims, but co-creators / accomplices of corruption (Miller et al. 1998 ). Eurobarometer (2014) reported that 84 % of the 300 Slovak fi rms it polled suspected that public-procurement tender conditions were normally prepared for a specifi c preselected supplier. Amongst other problems, the fi rms also claimed that those caught engaging in corrupt behaviour were rarely punished, and the selection criteria in procurement were deliberately vague.
We also asked our respondents some optional questions about corruption in public procurement. Th e fact that 91 % of suppliers and 85 % of contracting offi cials fi lled in this part indicates the urgency of the topic. Th eir common view was that corruption in Slovak public procurement is high level and systemic:
Th e corruption is not generated at the level of contracting authorities, but between elected leaders / appointed top managers and "pre-determined" suppliers … those who just carry out the process on the operational level do not infl uence its "pre-determined" results.
Contracting offi cial
Respondents' answers to the question "Is there corruption in Slovak public procurement ?" were as follows:
• 322 (51 %) of suppliers responded "defi nitely yes" and 178 (28 %) responded "maybe yes". No respondents answered "defi nitely no";
• 122 (57 %) of contracting offi cials responded "defi nitely yes" or "maybe yes" and only two replied "defi nitely no".
Not only do both suppliers and contractors see corruption as a signifi cant problem, they argue that it is either increasing or certainly not declining. Th ey say it increases with the size of contracts, and the government is unwilling to prevent it. Neither is whistle-blowing eff ective. Indeed, almost all suppliers claimed that reporting corruption leads to fi rms being put on unoffi cial black lists and excluded from future successful participation in tenders. Th ey emphasised that reported corruption is unpunished and whistle-blowers are unprotected. Protective laws are of little help.
Procurement offi cials who wish to tackle corruption have to face the fact that Slovak civil-service and public-service legislation is widely seen as unsatisfactory. Indeed, the EU declared that improvements in civil-service legislation and behaviour were a core conditionality to be addressed aft er Slovakia's 2004 entry. However, Meyer-Sahling (2009) characterised Slovak civil-service developments aft er 2004 as a "destructive reversal process". In 2017, under EU pressure, the Civil Service law was amended. Th is may have improved performance and protections in a service long seen as politicised, based on patronage, and lacking any strong ethical dimension (Stanova 2014) .
Competitiveness
As noted above, competitiveness is expected to have an important impact on the effi ciency of procurement. But Slovak performance in this area is very poor. Indeed Strand et al. (2011) claim that for 2006 -2010 Slovakia was the least competitive of all members in above-the-EU-threshold procurement.
We assessed the competitiveness of "national" public procurement for 2009 -2014 . Th ese are the below-the-EU-threshold cases, reported in the public-procurement journal. Th e results are worrying: for this period the average number of bids for supplies of goods was around two, for services about three, and for works around fi ve. With so few bids the risk of collusion cartels is extremely high (Pavel 2013) .
The impact of competitiveness on the fi nal price
We calculated the impact of competition on price, by plotting the number of bids per procurement against the diff erence between the estimated and fi nal price of the procurement. Th e data, covering 27,234 cases from the period 1 January 2009 -12 August 2014, came from the server tender.sme.sk, administered by Transparency International Slovakia.
Th e procurements were divided into groups by the number of bids received for the procurement. For each group the absolute value of savings was calculated. So, the calculation is weighted to include the size of the contract. But to avoid large contracts over-dominating the result, we removed all contracts that were greater than 0.1 % of the total value of that group's contracts. Th e results are shown in Figure 1 . Although the groups with large numbers of bidders have relatively few members, the overall result -that optimum savings occur in the groups with 6 -9 bidders -is very similar to that in the existing literature, reviewed in section 1 above.
We also used a regression model to test for the determinants of savings for procurement above the EU threshold for 2009 -2013 . Th e data source was the European Commission, and it was published in Tenders Electronic Daily. We cleaned the data of all samples that seemed 6 incorrect, eliminating about a fi ft h of tenders, and processed them using EViews soft ware. Th e dependent variable is the fi nal price savings in a procurement: i.e. savings as a percentage of the estimated price. Th e independent variable, "number of bidders" was in the range 1-n, while the independent variables "EU fi nancing", "Lowest price criterion" and "Subcontracting" took the values yes / no. Th e fi rst two of these independent variables were signifi cant at the 1 % level, and the third and fourth were signifi cant at the 10 % level. Table 9 shows the core results. Th e number of observations was 8,426, the adjusted coeffi cient of determination was 0.136. Th e latter is low, but high enough to consider the independent variable results . Th e fact that the use of the lowest price-selection criterion delivers greater savings is not a surprise, for most studies conclude that using the criterion leads to lower-quality products being delivered. We return to this below. On the other hand, the fact that procurement for EU-fi nanced activities is less economical might seem a surprise, because EU funds are subject to relatively comprehensive control. Th e implication is that the controls are insuffi ciently eff ective.
Finally, we used data from the most recent period, 2014 -2017, to see if it confi rmed the above fi ndings. Again, we used a GLM regression model, but this time our data was drawn from the Electronic contracting system, where bidders can enter more than one off er, as an e-auction is used in bidding. We divided procurements by type into goods, services and works. Th e results in Table 10 show large increases in the adjusted coeffi cient of determination and confi rm that more bidders lead to lower public-procurement fi nal prices. Th e savings from an extra off er, for goods, and for services, is positive, but low. 
The impact of e-auctions on the fi nal price
From the data used in Figure 1 above, we also calculated the results of procurements with and without the use of e-auctions. Th e results are shown in Figure 2 . If there are two or more bidders, on average eauctions lead to greater savings. But if there is only one bidder, on average e-auctions produce overpricing. 
Lowest-price selection criterion
Until 2015 the Slovak public procurement law (PPL) defi ned only two possible selection criteria -the most economically advantageous bid (MEAT) and the lowest price. Th e current law 343 / 2015 added life-cycle costs (LCC) as a third possible criterion. As our data predate this third criterion, we use only MEAT and the lowest-price criteria. Figures 3 and 4 show the proportion of public procurement of services and works decided on the lowest-price criterion, for selected countries. Clearly this criterion is used much more commonly in Central and Eastern Europe than in the other four European countries. As most goods are well standardised, they can be bought with minimum risk using the lowest-price criterion. But purchasing services and works in this way is a risky strategy, because quality is likely to vary with price.
Why does this happen ? In our experience, it happens for three main reasons. First, procurement offi cials are reluctant to bear the risk connected with the use of more complicated selection criteria. Second, offi cials want to avoid the extra work involved in applying more complicated decision criteria. Th is is an example of passive waste. Th ird, offi cials have only limited access to information on how to appropriately apply the MEAT criterion (Sumpikova et al. 2015) .
Figure 3
Proportion of public procurement of services awarded using lowest price criterion Th e use of the lowest-price criterion in Slovak public procurement has one further dimension: e-auctions. E-auctions are common, and two observations from suppliers provide stark examples of some of the problems with the lowest-price criterion, and with e-auctions.
Our business is security services -many fi rms in this segment submit unrealistically low prices, and if they win the tender, they pay illegally low salaries, or apply for contract amendments.
Supplier 1 We would add that such low salaries would probably be paid to pensioners, or to non-Slovaks. Th e contract amendments will oft en have been secretly agreed before the bid is entered.
Th e e-market is also used for services like translations. We have participated in many auctions, where, at the fi nal moment, an unrealistically low price was proposed. For such a price good-quality translation services cannot be delivered. We cannot compete in this environment.
Supplier 2 It is too early to assess the impact of the relatively new EU Directive 2014 / 24 / EU, which focuses on the MEAT decision criterion, on the development of the Slovak procurement market.
Conclusions
Th e goal of this paper was to determine the main factors causing ineffi ciencies in the Slovak public-procurement system, and where possible to supply some quantitative or qualitative assessments of their importance.
Th e questionnaire survey of the contracting authorities and suppliers, interviews with experts, and secondary data indicated four key factors.
First, excessive bureaucracy in public procurement, including the impact of frequent legislative changes, generates excessive transaction costs. Slovak procurement legislation was revised 35 times in the decade aft er 2006. For as early as 2008, Strand et al. (2011) had calculated that amongst EU members, for procurements above the EU threshold, Slovak procurement administrative costs per tender were the fi ft h highest for contractors, and costs per bid were the second highest for suppliers. Our survey showed that in 2017, 68 % of contractors and 59 % of suppliers identifi ed excessive bureaucracy as one of the top three effi ciency problems with the Slovak procurement system. 56 % of contractors also blamed frequent changes in legislation.
Second, corruption and other ethical shortcomings raise procurement costs and may damage the quality supplied. Our 2017 survey results show that 56 % of contractors blamed corruption and non-ethical behaviour for ineffi ciencies. In addition, 49 % of suppliers blamed corruption and 59 % blamed non-ethical behaviour.
Th ird, limited competitiveness, in the form of too few bidders, means possible savings are missed. 16 % of contractors, and 8 % of suppliers identifi ed competition as a major effi ciency problem.
Finally, excessive use of the lowest-price selection criterion for services and works can adversely aff ect quality and lead to non-transparent procurer-supplier relations. 29 % of suppliers picked out poor quality control as a top-three problem.
Removing these roadblocks to an effi cient and eff ective public procurement system would be a complex, long-term project. Amongst other things it would involve fundamental alterations to a large set of hard-to-change institutional factors, beginning with the widespread toleration of corruption. Th erefore, we leave detailed policy recommendations as a task for future study.
